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Abstract 
The discussion about the possible taxation of the financial sector has started in the European Union as a result of the financial 
crisis which has spread to the Europe from the United States in 2008. The EU Member States individually committed to support 
the financial sector for a total about EUR 4.6 trillion (i.e. 39% of EU-27 GDP in 2009). Those public interventions have 
significant budgetary consequences (strongly felt in Greece, Spain or Italy) and imposed a heavy burden on the present and future 
generations. Therefore there is a strong consensus not only on the level of the European Union but also internationally, that 
financial sector should contribute to the public finance more fairly. Moreover, with respect to the fact, that the crises was the 
result of complex interaction of market failures, global monetary and financial imbalances and weak supervision, it has been 
argued, that taxes could be used as regulatory tools. However, the imposition of FTT on financial sector is very sensitive issue. 
Due to this fact it will not be implemented through the directive (requiring the unanimity of all EU Member States) but rather 
through enhanced cooperation (i.e. only by countries willing to do that – by EU-11). The aim of the paper is to research, whether 
the revenues from the imposition of financial transaction tax through enhanced cooperation could be used as a new own resource 
of EU budget and whether it would enable to replace GNI contribution of EU-11 as announced by the European Commission. 
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Nomenclature 
G Impacts of applied research results  
G.02  Economic development 
G.02.12 Other 
1. Introduction 
Due to the fact that the recent financial crisis weakened the European Single Market, it is crucially important to 
actively support the foundations of the European economic system. For this reason the European Union has taken 
significant steps to improve coordination of economic governance and towards the creation of the new EU budget 
revenue. This mission also has been accepted in the strategy Europe 2020 which is targeted to make Europe more 
stable, successful and competitive. Since the discussion about the consequences of financial crisis had rather global 
character, the ideas about the new forms of taxation have been shaping on three international platforms. 
Nevertheless, the main idea of the budgetary consolidation is based on the development of own resources. With 
regard to the economic efficiency the debate is rather about the right mix of resources than about the size of the EU 
budget. 
First scenario represents financial activities tax (hereinafter as FAT), which was discussed mainly on the field of 
International Monetary Fund (hereinafter as IMF) and on the field of European Union in 2010. The second scenario, 
which has been discussed since 2009, represents the possibility of introduction of bonus tax, surcharge to the 
corporate income tax in the financial sector or the introduction of the fee on the currency transactions. After the 
discussion and consideration of all the consequences and impacts, the European Commission started to explore the 
idea of implementation of financial transaction tax (hereinafter as FTT) in 2011. On 28th September 2011, the 
Commission published a draft of the directive introducing a common system of FTT, to be implemented by Member 
States by 1st January 2014. After some of the EU Member States rejected the implementation of financial 
transaction tax, European Commission decided to introduce the tax through enhanced cooperation – i.e. that the 
implementation takes place only in the EU Member States willing to participate. 
The European Commission promotes financial transaction tax as a new own resource of the European Union. The 
FTT as a new resource of EU budget should help to raise the revenues because there is the growing concern that 
neither the current spending priorities on agricultural and regional transfers nor the EU’s revenue system is not 
adequate secured after the financial crisis. Although at the beginning the imposition of FTT was considered mainly 
in connection with the regulation of the financial market, recently it started to be considered mainly as a tool for 
raising the revenue and collecting back the money which has been invested in to the financial sector during the 
financial crisis. The FTT system should contribute to wider budgetary consolidation efforts undertaken in the EU 
Member States and participate, to the greatest extent possible, in the development of the policies of the European 
Union. 
Further, the FTT would generate a new stream of public revenue, leading to a reduction in EU Member States' 
contributions. As mentioned by the European Commission (2012) in its press release, the individual Member States 
could reduce their direct contributions based on gross national income (hereinafter as GNI) to the EU budget and 
could therefore save 50 % of their GNI contribution if it would be introduced for all EU-27 states. 
It is a difficult question, whether the FTT can represent sufficient and stability revenue of EU budget when 
introduced in EU-11 only. The aim of this paper is to research, whether the revenues from the imposition of 
financial transaction tax would be sufficient enough to be used as a new own resource of EU budget and whether it 
would enable to replace GNI contribution of EU-11.  
2. Theoretical Background 
The tax revenue generated by the FTT is extremely difficult to predict. It depends on a number of factors as the 
tax rate, the tax base, exempt transactions, extent of financial instruments that are subjected to the tax as well as on 
the dynamic of the trading volume or institutions. Further, looking back into the history of FTT, there can be 
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identified, that the FTT in different forms has already been levied in some states. Some European countries already 
have an experience with this type of tax as for example Belgium, Finland, Ireland, Poland, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom. In the last 20 years, there is clearly visible the trend towards the abolishment of this tax, due to the fact 
that FTT did not fulfil the expectations connected with the economy and national budget. For this reason, these EU 
Member States (expect Belgium) are not willing to join the enhanced cooperation on FTT. 
As also noted by Matheson (2011), revenue experiences from financial or securities transaction taxes over the 
past two decades have varied widely. Matheson (2011) estimates that France, Japan, Germany and Italy collected at 
most 0.2 % of GDP in revenues from them since 1990 and the United Kingdom and Switzerland have reaped 
significantly more than 0.2 % of GDP. Predictably, the revenue on this type of tax displays a cyclical pattern, rising 
and falling with financial market activity. 
However, despite the negative experiences of some countries, the European Commission (2013) estimates that 
the introduction of FTT through enhanced cooperation could raise the revenue at the amount of between EUR 30 
and 35 bn. per a year. For the calculation of the revenue on FTT, European Commission (2011) used the tax rate in 
amount of 0.1 % for financial transaction other than those related to derivates contracts and in amount of 0.01 % for 
financial transactions related to derivates contracts, transaction costs of 0.06 % of transaction volume for equity and 
bonds, of 0.07 % for OTC derivates, of 0.03 % for exchange derivates and of 0.024 % for FX Spot Market. Further, 
it applies the value of elasticity between −2 and 0 and the value of evasion between 10 % and 90 % depending on 
the financial product. Based on these assumptions, the European Commission (2011) estimated the annually FTT 
revenues around EUR 57 bn. for EU-27. However, the initial proposals to establish the FTT covering the EU-27 
failed, and the enhanced co-operation approach was adopted by the EU-11.  
In contrast, Spahn (2002) and Spratt (2005) calculate the tax revenue on the EU level. Spratt (2002) estimates the 
revenues on the Tobin tax between USD 16.6 to 20.8 bn. by the tax rate of 0.01 % and 0.02 % and Spratt (2005) 
calculates the revenues between USD 2.07 to 4.4 bn. by the tax rate of 0.005 %. Other study of Jetin and Denys 
(2005) proposed a specific formula for estimating FTT revenues. Jetin and Denys (2005) used the sophisticated 
methodology for estimation of the revenue which is based on hypotheses concerning the fiscal evasion and fraud 
and the sensibility of the volume of transactions to the tax rate (the volume elasticity) in dependence on the 
transactional cost. They estimate the amount of the annual revenue based on the application of the tax rate to the tax 
base, which is calculated as the market turnover reduced by volume of fiscal evasion and elasticity. For this reason, 
they use an average daily turnover in traditional foreign exchange markets, the tax rate at the level of 0.01 % and 
0.1 %, the pre-tax transaction cost in the amount of 0.02 % and 0.1 % and the elasticity in the amount of −1.5. They 
assumption the annual revenue around USD 6 to 10 bn. for the tax rate of 0.01 % and around USD 10 to 38 bn. for 
the tax rate of 0.1 %. 
Further, Schulmeister, Schratzenstaller and Picek (2008) use a similar assumption and estimate that the 
imposition of FTT would raise between USD 202 to 266 bn. on the global level and between USD 28 to 143 bn. on 
the European level (depending on the tax rate). As estimated by Schulmeister (2011) in his study, the potential 
revenue of FTT could raise around USD 310 bn. with tax rate of 0.05 % in Europe for 2010. In contrast, McCulloch 
and Pacillo (2011) estimate the revenues from FTT at global level between USD 147 and 577 bn. excluding OTC 
contracts and from 482 to 1.631 bn. USD including OTC markets. Several proponents of such tax have developed 
revenue estimates for hypothetical national or multilateral transaction taxes. For example, Pollin et al (2003) 
propose the security transaction tax for the United States and estimate that the tax revenues would amount between 
USD 66 to 132 bn. per year.  
In other study of Schulmeister and Sokoll (2013) estimate the revenue in amount of around USD 75.1 bn., i. e. 
around EUR 56 bn. for EU-11. Their estimation is more optimistic and consisting of several steps including 
specification of the most important regional market places for transactions established in the European Union, 
specification of the most important countries of residence with market shares, estimation of relocation of 
transactions and matrix of transaction between the 13 countries of residence in each of the regional markets. 
Although their investigation is sophisticated, according to our findings it is overestimated due to the difficulty to 
incorporate the issuance principle and the limited market to the formula for estimation of revenues. One might argue 
that the area of EU-11 is a small market in where the financial institutions could apply the more aggressive financial 
strategies, i.e. shifting capital to other countries without the FTT. It can be noted that the studies of Schulmeister and 
Sokoll (2013) abstracted from the issuance principle because there is very difficult to determine the impact of this 
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principle on the estimation of revenue. As added by European Commission (2013), such comprehensive data mining 
and analysis was not possible as most of the data needed for this are not yet public. 
As noted by the European Commission (2011, 2013), the FTT would also have no negative impact on economic 
performance, due to the fact that the FTT could be used either to reduce public debt, to reduce other taxes or for 
productive public investment. The FTT was adopted as a new own resource of the EU budget and according to the 
European Commission (2012), the FTT will significantly reduce the contributions of all Member States to the EU 
budget. According to estimates presented by the European Commission (2012), the FTT would reduce EU Member 
States' GNI contributions to the EU budget by 50 % if it would be introduced for EU-27. It means that the EU 
Member States could therefore save 50 % of their GNI contribution into the EU budget. These saved contributions 
should be used as new public investments in individual states by government or as the saved money for the reducing 
of the public debt, which might lead to start-up economic growth. The amount of decrease in the GNI contribution 
shows the following Table 1. 
Table 1. Estimated reduction of GNI contribution to the EU budget by Member State in million Euros (for EU-27). 
State Saved GNI State Saved GNI State Saved GNI State Saved GNI 
Belgium −1 588 Greece −896 Luxembourg −154 Romania −634 
Bulgaria −176 Spain −4 741 Hungary −423 Slovenia −166 
Czech Rep. −658 France −8 768 Malta −27 Slovakia −388 
Denmark −1 026 Italy −6 457 Netherlands −2 634 Finland −834 
Germany −10 753 Cyprus −80 Austria −1 248 Sweden −1 664 
Estonia −67 Latvia −81 Poland −1 813 Un. Kingdom −7 692 
Ireland −534 Lithuania −131 Portugal −645 TOTAL −54 226 
Source: European Commission press release no. IP/12/300 (2012). 
3. Methodology 
The main reason of introduction of FTT is that the FTT may help governments to recover the cost of the recent 
financial crisis and potential future financial crisis and may help to consolidate their budgets. Further, the tax could 
in theory bring substantial revenues. However, the exact amount of the tax revenue is highly uncertain and would 
very much depend on the base and the rates used. It would also crucially depend on the reaction of the market 
operators.  
Regardless of the risks, the FTT represents the potential possible own resources of EU budget and one of the least 
expensive ways of collecting taxes, as most transactions are carried out electronically and the tax can be collected 
electronically too.  
For the aim of this paper, the estimation of revenue on FTT is constructed based on the following formula (1), 
which was used by the Jetin and Denys (2005) and by the European Commission (2011, 2013): 
HWW ¹¸
·
©¨
§  
c
EVR 1    (1) 
where τ is the tax rate, V is the annual transaction volume, E is interpreted as relocation and fiscal evasion, c 
describes the transaction costs in percent of the transaction volume and ε is an elasticity which describes the effect 
of a tax increase on the transaction volume, i.e. the tax base. 
The assumptions for the estimation of revenues on FTT are based on the assumptions comprised in the impact 
assessment of European Commission (2011, 2013) as well as in the study of Schulmeister and Sokoll (2013). The 
study is based on following assumptions. 
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The tax rate is applied in accordance with the proposal of FTT directive, i.e. in amount of 0.1 % in case of the 
financial transactions other than those related to derivates contracts and of 0.01 % in case of financial transaction 
related to derivates contracts.  
The data on the annual transaction volume were gained from Federation of European Stock Exchanges (FESE) 
for equities, bonds and derivates and from Bank for International Settlement (BIS) for foreign exchange markets and 
for OTC derivates. The data were collected for 2010. According to the fact that the estimation of revenues is 
increased over time, as showed by Schmidt and Bhushan (2011) and European Commission (2011), we consider the 
application of one annual dataset as sufficient for the assumption of revenues. The annual data were also used by 
Schulmeister and Sokoll (2013) for year 2010. 
In the light of the methodological difficulties, firstly, the data were collected and the estimation of revenues was 
performed for EU-27. Secondly, in order to estimate the revenue for EU-11 it was necessary to use the proxies as the 
size of economics of the FTT jurisdiction (measured by percentage of the GDP). The similar procedure was applied 
by European Commission (2013) which pointed out that it is necessary to resolve the problem with the transaction 
carried out outside the European Union and with the transaction of the European party which is acting in the name 
or for the account of a non-European party. For this reason the proxy was used and the data were collected for all 
EU-27.  
The relocation and fiscal evasion are important in the case of derivates where it is the biggest risk of non-
taxation. The estimation of relocation and tax evasions comes out from impact assessment of European Union 
(2011). For this reason, the relocation and evasion for FX Spot market is 40 %, for FX Swaps and FX Outright 
Forwards 90 %. The evasion for equity trading and bonds is 10 %.  
The transaction costs are assumed for equity and bond in 0.06 % of transaction volume, for exchange derivates in 
0.03 % of transaction volume, for OTC derivates in 0.07 % of transaction volume and for FX Spot Market in 
0.024 % of transaction volume. 
The elasticity is defined as the relative change in the transaction volume to a relative change in the tax rate. The 
impact assessment of the European Commission (2011) mentioned, that elasticity means that a 1 percent increase in 
the tax rate leads to a 1 percent reduction in the tax base. As noted by Jetin and Denys (2005), the different financial 
institutions can be more or less sensible to the same transaction cost increase. It should be noted that financial 
companies are more sensitive to taxes than non-financial companies. Further, the authors added, that the higher the 
sensibility of trades is, the higher the reduction of volume. According to the available evidence in the literature, the 
highest elasticity is found for taxes on financial transactions particularly on futures transactions and for other 
transactions can be very low (for example for spot transactions), as is noted in the impact assessment of European 
Commission (2011). As stated in this impact assessment, the span of tax elasticity for transactions is different and 
for spot may be from 0.5 to 1.5, for futures from 0.5 to 2.5, for equity trading and bonds from −0.5 to −2. According 
to the European Commission (2011, 2013), the elasticity may take values from 2 to −2 depending on the product. 
For the estimation of revenues, the elasticity is assumed to be −1.5 and 1.5 (European Commission, 2013). It can be 
conclude that relatively little serious research has been conducted on estimating of the elasticity in financial markets. 
The main results are examined also by Matheson (2011) and by McCulloch and Pacillo (2011). 
4. Results 
The following Table 2 shows the main research results. The estimation of revenue lies within the interval which 
was researched by the European Commission, which concluded, that FTT introduced through enhanced cooperation 
would raise EUR 30 to 35 bn. As we were assuming the elasticity of −1.5 and 1.5, which is lower than −2 and 2 
assumed by the European Commission, we conclude that FTT introduced through enhanced cooperation could raise 
around EUR 33 bn. per year. As was already mentioned above, as the proxy for the calculation of the share of  
EU-11 was selected GDP of EU-11 (i.e. in 2012 the GDP in PPS of the EU-11 was 65.5 % of the EU-27 GDP, in 
2011 66.4 %). 
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10% 
22% 
68% 
Shares
Bonds
Derivates
Table 2. The estimation of FTT revenue for EU-11 in billion Euros. 
Financial product Estimated FTT revenues 
Shares 3.4 
Bonds 7.3 
Derivates 22.4 
Total 33.1 
Source: FESE, BIS, European Commission (2011, 2013) and author’s processing.  
With regard to the difficulties concerning issuance and residence principle it should be noted that the revenue 
estimation performed in this paper is based on rather conservative approach. Despite this, the FTT revenues would 
be around 0.4 % of GDP and according to the latest developments, the capital taxes amounts to 0.3 % of GDP for 
the EU-27. In that connection is necessary to state that proposed FTT would double current taxes on capital in  
EU-11. 
Based on the above presented results of the research, it can be concluded that FTT has the potential for raising 
revenue in the amount of EUR 33 bn. As can be concluded from the bellow stated Figure 1, the largest amount of 
the revenue would be generated from the trading of the derivatives.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. The proportion of the estimation of revenue by the type of financial product. 
Source: Author’s processing. 
It is necessary to mention that even though the EU-11 represents the economics which involve 70 % of the 
European Union GDP, most of the EU-11 countries are not the main financial centres. Therefore it is highly 
debatable, whether these states may generate sufficient revenue from financial transaction tax. The European 
Commission has mentioned that only two thirds of the collected tax would be used to finance the expenditures of the 
European Union. Based on the results of the above presented research, we can deduce that the GNI contribution of 
EU-11 can be reduced by EUR 22 bn. only. This means that the reduction is approximately 20 percentage points in 
contrast of 50% stated in first impact assessment of the European Commission. This fact the authors consider as the 
main reason for the conclusion that FTT revenues from EU-11 cannot be considered as the sufficient resource. The 
above mentioned situation is shown in the following Table 3 and 4. 
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Table 3. GNI contribution of individual Member States in 2012 in million Euros (for EU-11). 
State GNI GNI own resource 
UK 
correction 
Reduction in 
GNI granted 
to NL  
and SE 
VAT own 
resource 
Total national 
contribution 
Austria 305,028.30 2,390.95 26.88 20.30 326.98 2,765.11 
Belgium 376,906.00 2,953.09 188.56 25.26 475.78 3,642.69 
Estonia 16,584.50 121.40 8.10 1.00 23.00 153.50 
France 2,066,637.00 15,783.16 999.93 136.79 2,877.05 19,796.93 
Germany 2,730,080.00 20,616.96 224.33 175.80 1,803.19 22,820.28 
Greece 208,200.00 1,364.71 87.92 13.14 215.60 1681.37 
Italy 1,556,843.00 11,803.66 778.33 103.82 2,294.39 14,980.20 
Portugal 160,565.90 1,318.93 81.23 10.58 235.27 1,646.00 
Slovakia 69,417.70 524.50 33.10 4.60 83.95 646.15 
Slovenia 35,118.70 262.90 16.50 2.30 51.86 333.55 
Spain 1,048,100.00 7,777.79 498.48 68.20 1,317.14 9,661.61 
Total 8,573,481.10 64,918.04 2,943.35 561.80 9,704.20 78,127.40 
Source: EU Budget Financial Report 2012 and own research. 
Table 4. Estimated reduction in GNI contribution of EU-11 in million Euros (for EU-11). 
State 
Estimated 
reduction of 
GNI 
State 
Estimated 
reduction of 
GNI 
Austria −812.76 Italy −4,012.45 
Belgium −1,003.85 Portugal −448.35 
Estonia −41.27 Slovakia −178.29 
France −5,365.21 Slovenia −89.37 
Germany −7,008.38 Spain −2,643.93 
Greece −463.91 Total −22,067.77 
Source: Author’s processing. 
To sum up, according to the above-performed analysis, there is a presumption that the FTT revenues are very 
uncertain. This conclusion is due to the potential risk of the adverse economic developments (risk of drop trade) and 
of tax-avoidance due to the small area in which the FTT is applied, as stated by Alworth and Arachi (2012). The size 
of FTT revenues is also affected by the criterion of vertical equity which is not fulfilled. According to the principal 
of vertical equity, the subjects who are well-off should pay higher tax. In view of the fact that the FTT will be 
applied only in the EU-11 the institutions from this area will not be in the same situations as the financial institutions 
from the EU-17. That means that the financial institutions from the EU-11 should not pay the comparable tax as 
other institutions from the EU Member States not applying the FTT. The FTT has a progressive distributional effects 
– i.e. the impact is growing proportionally with the incomes. The main profitability financial activities take place on 
financial markets other than the EU-11 markets because the most of the EU Member States from group of the EU-11 
is smaller. 
The FTT is also connected with the risk of negative effects on the GDP growth, as noted by European 
Commission (2013). The Commission itself estimates that in the case of FTT tax revenues are used for productive 
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public investment, the net effect of introducing FTT on the long run level of GDP would be expected to be in the 
range between −0.1 and 0.1 percentage points. In contrast, Griffith-Jones and Persaud (2012) examine positive 
impacts and conclude that they are more than likely to compensate the negative effects so the impact of introducing 
an FTT on level of GDP, considering all the things, is likely to be positive, at around +0.25 %. Indeed, their analysis 
suggests that the overall positive impact on growth could be higher, and they identify a number of channels through 
which the FTT could support sustained growth. Outside of economic models, there are a many factors that 
contribute, directly and indirectly, to growth and it is important not to exaggerate the effects of the FTT itself. 
Furthermore, it is certainly the case that many of the countries that do have FTTs have not been growth laggards, 
such as: South Korea, Hong Kong, India, Brazil, Taiwan, South Africa and Switzerland, as mentioned by 
Twarowska and Szołno-Koguc (2013). On the contrary, Griffith-Jones and Persaud (2012) have been amongst the 
fastest growing economies in the world. 
Also, in order to eliminate negative effects on GDP, the proposed FTT comprise certain avoidance strategies. 
Firstly, the tax base is defined very broadly as regards products, transactions, types of trade and financial actors, as 
well as transactions carried out inside a financial group. The scope of the suggested FTT covers transactions relating 
to all types of financial instruments. It means those which are negotiable on the market, money-market instruments, 
and shares in collective investment undertakings as well as derivates agreements. It is important to mention, that the 
scope of the tax is not limited just on the transactions in organised markets, but covers also transactions in other 
types of markets including OTC (over-the-counter) markets. When a derivate agreement results into the supply of 
the financial instrument, the supply is also subjected to taxation. 
Secondly, the proposal is based on the residence principle and newly also on the issuance principle. This 
territorial principle with the issuance principle should mainly prevent relocation to tax havens and jurisdictions of 
outside the FTT. This relates mainly shares, bonds and equivalent securities, money-market instruments, structured 
produces, units and shares in collective investment undertakings and derivates trade on organised trade venues or 
platforms. In other cases the principle of residence is in force. Generally with respect to the issuance principle, the 
transaction is taxed in the EU Member State, where the issuer was established. The person involved in such 
transaction will be deemed to be established in that EU Member States and the FTT will be payable by this person in 
that state. The difference compared to the first proposal on FTT is that the original draft was based only the 
residence principle and the financial transaction could be taxed only in the state where the financial actor was 
established. At present, this means that the location of the transaction plays the significant role with respect to the 
taxation.  
Finally, by splitting of the tax rates, the proposal tries to minimise eventual impacts on the costs of capital for 
non-financial investment purposes. Therefore, the proposal suggest that the tax rates should not be lower than 0.1 % 
in respect of financial transactions other than derivate agreements and 0.01 % in respect of financial transactions 
related to derivates agreement. The FTT is chargeable for each financial transaction at the moment it occurs.  
4. Conclusion 
In the late 1980’s to mid-1990’s, there was much discussion about the FTT in the context of minimising swings 
in financial markets or as a revenue source of global proportions that could be earmarked for the alleviation of 
poverty. That discussion was not able to reach consensus for good reasons on balance, and a tax on financial 
transactions failed to be implemented at the global level. Nevertheless, the last financial crisis generated many ideas 
about the introduction of new additional tax on financial institutions again.  
The main reason of introduction of such tax is that the FTT may help governments to recover the cost of the 
recent financial crisis and potential future financial crisis and may help to consolidate their budgets. Further, the tax 
could in theory bring substantial revenues. However, the exact amount of the tax revenue is highly uncertain and 
would very much depend on the base and the rates used. It would also crucially depend on the reaction of the market 
operators.  
With respect to the fact that European Commission explicitly mentioned the idea, that FTT is considered as the 
candidate on new own resource of the budget which might partially replace GNI contribution of EU Member States, 
the research revealed that revenues from FTT might not be sufficient for the area of EU-11. Moreover, the research 
further revealed that GNI contributions’ EU Member States applying FTT could save about only 30 % of their GNI 
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contribution into the EU budget. The main reason why FTT is not fulfilling the criterion is the fact that most 
probably, it is going to be introduced through enhanced cooperation and not in the form of directive, which would 
force all EU Member States to introduce FTT. In case that the European Commission would search for the solution 
of full replacing of own resources, FTT would have to be implemented in combination with other new tax on the EU 
level in order to raise sufficient revenue for EU budget. Although as the research revealed, some form of FTT are 
already levied across in some EU Member States, the action on the EU level, even through enhanced cooperation, 
could prove to be more effective and efficient than uncoordinated individual actions of individual Member States. 
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